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Article 
Separation of Powers During the Forty-
Fourth Presidency and Beyond 
Brett M. Kavanaugh† 
Many of the contentious, bitter, and defining disputes of 
the forty-second and forty-third presidencies arose out of sepa-
ration of powers issues that the nation has been contending 
with since the Founding. And it seems to me—from having 
lived and worked through some of those disputes—that this is a 
good time to attempt to discern some lessons for the forty-
fourth and future presidencies. 
The challenges facing the nation at this time are urgent. 
By most accounts, al Qaeda is trying to commit new and even 
greater attacks on the United States.1 The nation is involved in 
two wars, with more than 150,000 U.S. service members dep-
loyed in Iraq and Afghanistan.2 At the same time, the U.S. 
economy is in trouble; experts have said the country might be 
in the worst economic crisis since the Great Depression.3  
This country recently witnessed a vigorous presidential 
campaign in which both candidates seemed to agree that the 
 
†  Judge, United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia 
Circuit. This Article is adapted from remarks I made at the University of 
Minnesota Law School on October 17, 2008—about two weeks before the pres-
idential election. I derived my suggestions from working in the executive and 
judicial branches for many years, from collaborating closely with the legisla-
tive branch on certain issues while I served in the executive branch, and from 
teaching separation of powers law at Harvard Law School for the last two 
years. Copyright © 2009 by Brett M. Kavanaugh. 
 1. See, e.g., Mark Mazzetti & Scott Shane, Al Qaeda Offers Obama In-
sults and a Warning, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 20, 2008, at A1. 
 2. See Steven Lee Myers, America’s Scorecard in Iraq, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 
8, 2009, at WK1 (indicating that 140,000 U.S. troops remain in Iraq); N. Atl. 
Treaty Org., International Security Assistance Force (Apr. 3, 2009), http:// 
www.nato.int/isaf/docu/epub/pdf/isaf_placemat.pdf (showing 26,215 U.S. 
troops in Afghanistan). 
 3. See, e.g., Jon Hilsenrath et al., Worst Crisis Since ’30s, With No End 
Yet in Sight, WALL ST. J., Sept. 18, 2008, at A1. 
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federal government is not working effectively in meeting the 
nation’s challenges.4 For many months during that campaign, 
both sides in the political arena talked about the need for 
change and reform in our nation’s capital.5 The three words 
“Washington is broken” became a common refrain—even in 
Washington.6 
What precisely does that catchy phrase “Washington is 
broken” really mean? What exactly is broken in Washington, 
and what needs to be changed and reformed? 
It seems to me that several of the foundational structures 
and systems in Washington are contributing to the perceived 
and actual problem. Many of those broken structures and sys-
tems implicate the separation of powers—and particularly, the 
interaction of the legislative and executive branches in per-
forming their respective and sometimes overlapping functions 
under the Constitution. 
Now is a good time, in my judgment, to take a cold hard 
look at some of the conventional wisdom about these institu-
tions of our federal government. Are they working as they 
should? And if not, how can we fix them? 
A good way to start the discussion is to think about some of 
the controversies the last two presidents have faced. Both Pres-
ident Bill Clinton and President George W. Bush had tumul-
tuous tenures in office that triggered numerous separation-of- 
powers controversies. 
In President Clinton’s administration, separation of powers 
disputes arose over: 
• War powers, and especially whether the President’s de-
cision to take offensive military action in Kosovo in 
1999 was consistent with the Constitution and the War 
Powers Resolution, particularly after the House failed 
to authorize the bombing;7 
 
 4. See, e.g., Dan Zak, As Campaigns Heat Up and Washington Gets Bea-
ten Down, Are There Any Pols Who Will Sing Its Praises?, WASH. POST, Aug. 
24, 2008, at A1 (quoting the McCain and Obama presidential campaigns). 
 5. See, e.g., id. 
 6. See, e.g., id. 
 7. See Campbell v. Clinton, 203 F.3d 19, 19 (D.C. Cir. 2000); Memoran-
dum from the Office of Legal Counsel, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, to the Att’y Gen., 
Authorization for Continuing Hostilities in Kosovo, available at 2000 WL 
33716980 (Dec. 19, 2000); David J. Barron & Martin S. Lederman, The Com-
mander in Chief at the Lowest Ebb—A Constitutional History, 121 HARV. L. 
REV. 941, 1090 (2008); Geoffrey S. Corn, Clinton, Kosovo, and the Final De-
struction of the War Powers Resolution, 42 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1149, 1149–55 
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• Impeachment, and whether perjury and obstruction of 
justice in a civil sexual harassment case and subsequent 
criminal investigation can constitute high crimes and 
misdemeanors justifying removal of a President;8 
• The independent counsel law, concerning both the sta-
tute itself and independent counsel Kenneth Starr’s ex-
ercise of his investigative and prosecutorial authority;9 
• Executive privilege, primarily whether government at-
torneys and Secret Service agents enjoy a privilege in 
federal criminal investigations of the President;10  
• Presidential immunity, particularly whether the Presi-
dent has the right to a temporary deferral of civil suits 
while in office, an issue the Supreme Court addressed in 
Clinton v. Jones;11 
 
(2001); Abraham D. Sofaer, The War Powers Resolution and Kosovo, 34 LOY. 
L.A. L. REV. 71, 71–79 (2000). 
 8. See Impeachment Inquiry Pursuant to H. Res. 581 Before the H. 
Comm. on the Judiciary, 105th Cong. 15–30 (1998) (statement of Kenneth 
Starr, Independent Counsel, Office of Independent Counsel); SUBMISSION BY 
COUNSEL FOR PRESIDENT CLINTON TO THE COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY OF 
THE UNITED STATES HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, S. DOC. NO. 106-3, at 1–3, 7 
(1998); H.R. REP. NO. 105-830, at 5–7 (1998). 
 9. See The Future of the Independent Counsel Act: Hearings Before the S. 
Comm. on Governmental Affairs, 106th Cong. 1–5 (1999) (statement of Sen. 
Fred Thompson, Chairman, S. Comm. on Governmental Affairs); Michael J. 
Gerhardt, The Historical and Constitutional Significance of the Impeachment 
and Trial of President Clinton, 28 HOFSTRA L. REV. 349, 382–84 (1999). See 
generally Symposium, The Independent Counsel Act: From Watergate to 
Whitewater and Beyond, 86 GEO. L.J. 2011 (1998) (containing contributions on 
the topic by Michael R. Bromwich, George D. Brown, Arthur H. Christy, Sa-
muel Dash, Joseph E. diGenova, Katy J. Harriger, Philip B. Heymann, Brett 
M. Kavanaugh, Norman J. Ornstein, Julie R. O’Sullivan, Jerome J. Shestack, 
Donald C. Smaltz, Cass R. Sunstein, and Lawrence E. Walsh). 
 10. See In re Lindsey, 158 F.3d 1263, 1278 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (per curiam) 
(holding that the attorney-client privilege does not prevent government attor-
neys from testifying in grand jury cases regarding possible criminal conduct by 
public officials); In re Sealed Case, 148 F.3d 1073, 1074 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (per 
curiam) (rejecting the “protective function privilege” for Secret Service agents); 
see also Rubin v. United States, 525 U.S. 990, 990 (1998) (Breyer, J., dissent-
ing from the denial of certiorari). 
 11. Clinton v. Jones, 520 U.S. 681, 684 (1997); see also Akhil Reed Amar, 
Nixon’s Shadow, 83 MINN. L. REV. 1405, 1415–16 (1999) (addressing Clinton v. 
Jones); Joseph Isenbergh, Impeachment and Presidential Immunity from 
Judicial Process, 18 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 53, 59–63 (1999) (same); Michael 
Stokes Paulsen, Nixon Now: The Courts and the Presidency After Twenty-five 
Years, 83 MINN. L. REV. 1337, 1337–45 (1999) (same). 
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• The pardon power, most notably whether President 
Clinton properly used that power when he pardoned 
certain people at the end of his presidency;12  
• The President’s control over executive branch person-
nel, particularly President Clinton’s decision shortly af-
ter taking office to fire all ninety-three United States 
Attorneys in one fell swoop;13  
• The President’s ability to obtain votes for his federal 
judicial nominees, as large numbers of Clinton judicial 
nominees never received an up-or-down vote in the Se-
nate.14 
That is a significant list. And President Bush’s administration 
has sparked its own separation of powers disputes. Some of the 
most contentious struggles have been over: 
• Presidential power and the wars against al Qaeda and 
later Iraq, most notably the controversies surrounding 
the detention and treatment of detainees at Guantána-
mo Bay and elsewhere, and the Terrorist Surveillance 
Program;15  
 
 12. See President Clinton’s Eleventh Hour Pardons: Hearing Before the S. 
Comm. on the Judiciary, 107th Cong. 1–2 (2001) (statement of Sen. Orrin G. 
Hatch, Chairman, S. Comm. on the Judiciary); The Controversial Pardon of 
International Fugitive Marc Rich: Hearings Before the H. Comm. on Govern-
ment Reform, 107th Cong. 2 (2001) (statement of Rep. Dan Burton, Chairman, 
H. Comm. on Government Reform); see also Gregory C. Sisk, Suspending the 
Pardon Power During the Twilight of a Presidential Term, 67 MO. L. REV. 
13,14–16 (2002) (discussing President Clinton’s controversial pardons). 
 13. See Paul Houston, Reno Demands That All 93 U.S. Attorneys Offer 
Resignations, L.A. TIMES, Mar. 24, 1993, at A8; David Johnston, Attorney Gen-
eral Seeks Resignations From Prosecutors, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 24, 1993, at A1.  
 14. See President William J. Clinton, The State of the Union Address by 
the President of the United States (Jan. 27, 1998), in 144 CONG. REC. H30, 
H33 (“I simply ask the United States Senate to heed this plea and vote on the 
highly qualified judicial nominees before you up or down.”); President William 
J. Clinton, President’s Radio Address (Sept. 27, 1997), in 33 WKLY COMP. 
PRES. DOC. 1442, 1442–43; see also Richard L. Berke, Clinton Seeks Action on 
Court Nominees, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 28, 1997, at 33 (reporting on President 
Clinton’s radio address). 
 15. See, e.g., Boumediene v. Bush, 128 S. Ct. 2229, 2240 (2008); Hamdan 
v. Rumsfeld, 126 S. Ct. 2749, 2753–57 (2006), superseded by statute, Military 
Commissions Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-366, 120 Stat. 2600, as recognized in 
Boumediene v. Bush, supra; Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 509 (2004); Ra-
sul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466, 470–73 (2004), superseded by statute, Detainee 
Treatment Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-148, 119 Stat. 2739; Al-Marri v. Puc-
ciarelli, 534 F.3d 213, 216–17 (4th Cir. 2008) (en banc), dismissed sub nom. Al-
Marri v. Spagone, No. 08-368 (U.S. Mar. 6, 2009); U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, LE-
GAL AUTHORITIES SUPPORTING THE ACTIVITIES OF THE NATIONAL SECURITY 
AGENCY DESCRIBED BY THE PRESIDENT, 1–3 (2006), available at http://www 
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• Executive privilege, including disputes over the Presi-
dential Records Act and conflicts over congressional 
access to executive branch information;16  
• The President’s control over executive branch person-
nel,17 especially the decision to dismiss certain United 
States Attorneys;18 
• The President’s use of signing statements to indicate his 
view that certain laws have potentially unconstitutional 
provisions or applications;19 and 
• The President’s power to obtain a vote for his federal 
judicial nominees, as large numbers of President Bush’s 
judicial nominees (like President Clinton’s) never re-
ceived an up-or-down vote in the Senate.20 
This also is a rather extraordinary list. Between the Clin-
ton and Bush administrations, moreover, the Supreme Court 
considered Bush v. Gore and decided an issue that effectively 
resolved the outcome of a national presidential election.21 Given 
all of those events and controversies, it is no wonder that our 
 
.usdoj.gov/opa/whitepaperonnsalegalauthorities.pdf; Curtis A. Bradley & Jack 
L. Goldsmith, Congressional Authorization and the War on Terrorism, 118 
HARV. L. REV. 2047, 2047–56 (2005); Curtis Bradley et al., On NSA Spying: A 
Letter to Congress, N.Y. REV. BOOKS, Feb. 9, 2006, at 42, 42–44. See generally 
JACK L. GOLDSMITH, THE TERROR PRESIDENCY: LAW AND JUDGMENT INSIDE 
THE BUSH ADMINISTRATION (2007) (discussing the Bush administration’s re-
sponse to the terrorist attacks of Sept. 11, 2001); BENJAMIN WITTES, LAW AND 
THE LONG WAR: THE FUTURE OF JUSTICE IN THE AGE OF TERROR (2008) (criti-
quing the U.S. government’s war on terror). 
 16. See, e.g., Citizens for Responsibility & Ethics in Wash. v. Cheney, 580 
F. Supp. 2d 168, 171–77 (D.D.C. 2008) (mem.). 
 17. See, e.g., Cheney v. U.S. Dist. Court, 542 U.S. 367, 372–73 (2004). 
 18. See U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, AN INVESTIGATION INTO THE REMOVAL OF 
NINE U.S. ATTORNEYS IN 2006, at 14 (2008).  
 19. See CHARLIE SAVAGE, TAKEOVER: THE RETURN OF THE IMPERIAL 
PRESIDENCY AND THE SUBVERSION OF AMERICAN DEMOCRACY 236–49 (2007); 
Curtis A. Bradley & Eric A. Posner, Presidential Signing Statements and Ex-
ecutive Power, 23 CONST. COMM. 307, 308–12 (2006); Walter Dellinger, Op-Ed., 
A Slip of the Pen, N.Y. TIMES, July 31, 2006, at A17; ABA TASK FORCE ON 
PRESIDENTIAL SIGNING STATEMENTS AND THE SEPARATION OF POWERS DOC-
TRINE, RECCOMENDATION, 1 (2006), available at http://www.abanet.org/op/ 
signingstatements/aba_final_signing_statements_recommendation-report_7 
-24-06.pdf. 
 20. See George W. Bush, President Bush Discusses Judicial Accomplish-
ments and Philosophy (Oct. 6, 2008), http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives 
.gov/news/releases/2008/10/20081006-5.html; George W. Bush, Remarks by the 
President on Judicial Confirmations (Oct. 30, 2002), http://georgewbush-
whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2002/10/20021030-6.html. 
 21. 531 U.S. 98, 109–10 (2000) (per curiam). 
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system of separation of powers and checks and balances has 
come under stress.  
Based on my experience in the White House and the Jus-
tice Department, in the independent counsel’s office, in the 
judicial branch as a law clerk and now a judge, and as a teacher 
of separation of powers law, I have developed a few specific 
ideas for alleviating some of the problems we have seen arise 
over the last sixteen years. I believe these proposals would 
create a more effective and efficient federal government, consis-
tent with the purposes of our Constitution as outlined in the 
Preamble.22 Fully justifying these ideas would require writing a 
book—and probably more than one. My goal in this forum is far 
more modest: to identify problems worthy of additional atten-
tion, sketch out some possible solutions, and call for further 
discussion. 
I.  PROVIDE SITTING PRESIDENTS WITH A TEMPORARY 
DEFERRAL OF CIVIL SUITS AND OF CRIMINAL 
PROSECUTIONS AND INVESTIGATIONS   
First, my chief takeaway from working in the White House 
for five-and-a-half years—and particularly from my nearly 
three years of work as Staff Secretary, when I was fortunate to 
travel the country and the world with President Bush—is that 
the job of President is far more difficult than any other civilian 
position in government. It frankly makes being a member of 
Congress or the judiciary look rather easy by comparison. The 
decisions a President must make are hard and often life-or-
death, the pressure is relentless, the problems arise from all di-
rections, the criticism is unremitting and personal, and at the 
end of the day only one person is responsible. There are not 
eight other colleagues (as there are on the Supreme Court), or 
ninety-nine other colleagues (as there are in the Senate), or 434 
other colleagues (as there are in the House). There is no review 
panel for presidential decisions and few opportunities for do-
overs. The President alone makes the most important deci-
sions. It is true that presidents carve out occasional free time to 
exercise or read or attend social events. But don’t be fooled. The 
job and the pressure never stop. We exalt and revere the presi-
dency in this country—yet even so, I think we grossly underes-
 
 22. See U.S. CONST., pmbl. (“[I]n Order to form a more perfect Union, es-
tablish Justice, insure domestic Tranquility, provide for the common defence, 
promote the general Welfare, and secure the Blessings of Liberty to ourselves 
and our Posterity . . . .”). 
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timate how difficult the job is. At the end of the Clinton presi-
dency, John Harris wrote an excellent book about President 
Clinton entitled The Survivor.23 I have come to think that the 
book’s title is an accurate description for all presidents in the 
modern era. 
Having seen first-hand how complex and difficult that job 
is, I believe it vital that the President be able to focus on his 
never-ending tasks with as few distractions as possible. The 
country wants the President to be “one of us” who bears the 
same responsibilities of citizenship that all share. But I believe 
that the President should be excused from some of the burdens 
of ordinary citizenship while serving in office. 
This is not something I necessarily thought in the 1980s or 
1990s. Like many Americans at that time, I believed that the 
President should be required to shoulder the same obligations 
that we all carry. But in retrospect, that seems a mistake. 
Looking back to the late 1990s, for example, the nation certain-
ly would have been better off if President Clinton could have 
focused on Osama bin Laden24 without being distracted by the 
Paula Jones sexual harassment case and its criminal-
investigation offshoots.25 To be sure, one can correctly say that 
President Clinton brought that ordeal on himself, by his an-
swers during his deposition in the Jones case if nothing else. 
And my point here is not to say that the relevant actors—the 
Supreme Court in Jones, Judge Susan Webber Wright, and In-
dependent Counsel Kenneth Starr—did anything other than 
their proper duty under the law as it then existed.26 But the 
law as it existed was itself the problem, particularly the extent 
to which it allowed civil suits against presidents to proceed 
while the President is in office.  
With that in mind, it would be appropriate for Congress to 
enact a statute providing that any personal civil suits against 
presidents, like certain members of the military, be deferred 
 
 23. JOHN F. HARRIS, THE SURVIVOR: BILL CLINTON IN THE WHITE HOUSE 
(2005). 
 24. Cf. James Bennet, U.S. Cruise Missiles Strike Sudan and Afghan 
Targets Tied to Terrorist Network, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 21, 1998, at A1 (reporting 
on American missile strikes on targets linked to Osama bin Laden). 
 25. Cf. Richard L. Berke, Outside Political Circles, a Deep Sense of Sad-
ness and Shock, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 17, 1998, at A11 (describing President Clin-
ton’s grand jury testimony as “the most politically and legally hazardous mo-
ment” of his career). 
 26. I worked for Judge Starr and believe he performed his difficult legal 
assignment diligently and properly under a badly flawed statutory regime. 
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while the President is in office. The result the Supreme Court 
reached in Clinton v. Jones27—that presidents are not constitu-
tionally entitled to deferral of civil suits—may well have been 
entirely correct; that is beyond the scope of this inquiry. But 
the Court in Jones stated that Congress is free to provide a 
temporary deferral of civil suits while the President is in of-
fice.28 Congress may be wise to do so, just as it has done for cer-
tain members of the military.29 Deferral would allow the Presi-
dent to focus on the vital duties he was elected to perform. 
Congress should consider doing the same, moreover, with 
respect to criminal investigations and prosecutions of the Pres-
ident.30 In particular, Congress might consider a law exempting 
a President—while in office—from criminal prosecution and in-
vestigation, including from questioning by criminal prosecutors 
or defense counsel. Criminal investigations targeted at or re-
volving around a President are inevitably politicized by both 
their supporters and critics. As I have written before, “no At-
torney General or special counsel will have the necessary credi-
bility to avoid the inevitable charges that he is politically moti-
vated—whether in favor of the President or against him, 
depending on the individual leading the investigation and its 
results.”31 The indictment and trial of a sitting President, 
moreover, would cripple the federal government, rendering it 
unable to function with credibility in either the international or 
domestic arenas. Such an outcome would ill serve the public in-
terest, especially in times of financial or national security cri-
sis.  
Even the lesser burdens of a criminal investigation—
including preparing for questioning by criminal investigators—
are time-consuming and distracting. Like civil suits, criminal 
investigations take the President’s focus away from his or her 
responsibilities to the people. And a President who is concerned 
about an ongoing criminal investigation is almost inevitably 
going to do a worse job as President.  
 
 27. 520 U.S. 681, 684 (1997). 
 28. Id. at 709 (“If Congress deems it appropriate to afford the President 
stronger protection, it may respond with appropriate legislation.”). 
 29. See Servicemembers Civil Relief Act, 50 U.S.C. app. §§ 501–596 (2000 
& Supp. 2006). 
 30. See Brett M. Kavanaugh, The President and the Independent Counsel, 
86 GEO. L.J. 2133, 2157–61 (1998). 
 31. Id. at 2157. Even in the absence of congressionally conferred immuni-
ty, a serious constitutional question exists regarding whether a President can 
be criminally indicted and tried while in office. See id. at 2158–61. 
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One might raise at least two important critiques of these 
ideas. The first is that no one is above the law in our system of 
government. I strongly agree with that principle. But it is not 
ultimately a persuasive criticism of these suggestions. The 
point is not to put the President above the law or to eliminate 
checks on the President, but simply to defer litigation and in-
vestigations until the President is out of office.32 
A second possible concern is that the country needs a check 
against a bad-behaving or law-breaking President. But the 
Constitution already provides that check. If the President does 
something dastardly, the impeachment process is available.33 
No single prosecutor, judge, or jury should be able to accom-
plish what the Constitution assigns to the Congress.34 Moreo-
ver, an impeached and removed President is still subject to 
criminal prosecution afterwards. In short, the Constitution es-
tablishes a clear mechanism to deter executive malfeasance; we 
should not burden a sitting President with civil suits, criminal 
investigations, or criminal prosecutions.35 The President’s job is 
difficult enough as is. And the country loses when the Presi-
dent’s focus is distracted by the burdens of civil litigation or 
criminal investigation and possible prosecution.36 
 
 32. For fairness’s sake, this proposal may also require extension of the re-
levant statutes of limitations. 
 33. See U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 3, cl. 6. 
 34.  Brett M. Kavanaugh, Op-Ed., First Let Congress Do Its Job: A Deep 
Structural Flaw in the Independent Counsel Statute, WASH. POST, Feb. 26, 
1999, at A27. 
 35. I think this temporary deferral also should excuse the President from 
depositions or questioning in civil litigation or criminal investigations. 
 36. In a related manner, I believe that the independent counsel statute 
was a major mistake for reasons I have articulated previously. See Kava-
naugh, supra note 30, at 2134–35. Congress itself came to that conclusion in 
1999 when it declined to reauthorize the statute. See, e.g., 145 CONG. REC. 
S7766 (daily ed. Jun. 29, 1999) (statement of Sen. Specter) (“Tomorrow, the 
independent counsel statute will sunset. The law is dying because there ap-
pears to be a consensus that it created more problems than it solved.”). The 
law itself created a perverse structure that was inconsistent with foundational 
principles of separation of powers and that created problems for both the Pres-
ident and the independent counsel. See Kavanaugh, supra note 30, at 2134–
38. Judge Starr himself has made this same point. See The Future of the Inde-
pendent Counsel Act: Hearings Before the S. Comm. on Governmental Affairs, 
106th Cong. 425–34 (1999) (statement of Kenneth W. Starr, Independent 
Counsel).  
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II.  ENSURE PROMPT SENATE VOTES ON EXECUTIVE 
AND JUDICIAL NOMINATIONS   
Second, to make our government more effective and effi-
cient, the Senate might consider changing the way it approach-
es presidential nominations to both the executive and judicial 
branches. The Constitution gives the Senate the power of con-
firming presidential nominees to both branches.37 But although 
the constitutional text does not explicitly distinguish between 
standards the Senate should use in assessing such appoint-
ments, there are compelling reasons—deriving from the struc-
ture established by the constitutional text—that the Senate 
should approach its task differently depending on whether the 
appointment is to the executive or judicial branch.  
Executive branch officials are subordinate to (and general-
ly subject to removal at will by) the President. By contrast, fed-
eral judges enjoy life tenure and are independent of the politi-
cal branches. Therefore, the Senate arguably should be more 
deferential to the President with regard to executive branch 
appointees (at least those in traditional executive agencies, as 
opposed to the so-called independent agencies), and less so with 
regard to judicial appointees. This observation—coupled with 
the imperative both to promote government effectiveness by 
minimizing vacancies and to treat potential appointees fairly 
and respectfully—prompts some specific thoughts about re-
forming the confirmation process. 
As to executive branch appointments, any observer of 
Washington realizes that Presidents often have great difficulty 
filling positions requiring Senate approval because of delays in 
the confirmation process.38 This phenomenon is particularly se-
vere at the sub-cabinet level.39 The problem has plagued both 
Republican and Democratic presidents especially, but not only, 
when the opposing party controls the Senate.40 And it has clear 
costs in terms of efficiency and effectiveness. The President’s 
full team of executive branch officials is essential to carrying 
 
 37. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 5. 
 38. See, e.g., Paul C. Light, Op-Ed., Late for Their Appointments, N.Y. 
TIMES, Nov. 16, 2004, at A27; PAUL C. LIGHT & VIRGINIA L. THOMAS, THE ME-
RIT AND REPUTATION OF AN ADMINISTRATION: PRESIDENTIAL APPOINTEES ON 
THE APPOINTMENTS PROCESS 3–4 (2000), http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/ 
Files/rc/papers/2000/0428governance_light/20000428merit.pdf. 
 39. See, e.g., Light, supra note 38.  
 40. See, e.g., LEE EPSTEIN & JEFFREY A. SEGAL, ADVICE AND CONSENT: 
THE POLITICS OF JUDICIAL APPOINTMENTS 107 (2005). 
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out the President’s program of regulation and enforcement. 
Leaving key jobs unfilled can paralyze executive branch efforts 
to accomplish critical missions and discourages innovative and 
bold executive branch action.  
To be sure, in the power struggle that is Washington, Con-
gress sometimes seems to prefer an enfeebled executive. But 
this is short-sighted because, as Alexander Hamilton correctly 
stated in Federalist No. 70, “[a] feeble executive implies a 
feeble execution of the government.”41 The Senate could help 
eliminate these long-standing problems by adopting a binding 
rule requiring the full Senate to vote on all executive branch 
nominations—at least those within traditional executive agen-
cies—within thirty days of receiving a nomination. Such a rule 
would conform to the Framers’ idea of Senate confirmation, 
which was to prevent unfit characters from serving in the ex-
ecutive branch.42 As Hamilton wrote in Federalist No. 76, the 
Senate’s confirmation power serves as “an excellent check upon 
a spirit of favoritism in the President, and would tend greatly 
to prevent the appointment of unfit characters from State pre-
judice, from family connection, from personal attachment, or 
from a view to popularity.”43  
The constitutional structure does not envision the Senate 
confirmation process of executive officials as a tool for waging 
policy disputes, which are more properly contested through leg-
islation and appropriations. After all, executive branch officials 
are supposed to carry out the policies and priorities of the Pres-
ident. And our constitutional design has a single President; if 
Congress wishes to cabin the Executive’s discretion in imple-
menting statutes or constrain the executive branch’s program-
matic decisions, it can always pass more detailed statutes or 
use its power of the purse. But using the confirmation process 
as a backdoor way of impeding the President’s direction and 
supervision of the executive branch—of gumming up the 
works—is constitutionally irresponsible and makes our gov-
ernment function less efficiently and effectively. Wielding the 
confirmation process as a club against executive branch appoin-
tees would make sense in a different system of government 
where the agencies were not subject to presidential direction 
 
 41. THE FEDERALIST NO. 70, at 391 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossi-
ter ed., 1999).  
 42. Id. NO. 76, at 423. 
 43. See id. at 425. 
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and supervision. That is not the system created by the Consti-
tution. 
Of course, some parts of the executive branch—the so-
called “independent agencies”—are not subject to such presi-
dential discretion and supervision. Therefore, appointees to 
these agencies may require greater and longer scrutiny. After 
all, once they assume office, they are largely immune from 
substantive direction and supervision by the President or any-
one else, and cannot be fired at will.44 For that reason, it may 
be important for the Senate to scrutinize such appointees al-
most as closely as the Senate scrutinizes judicial nominees. In 
the next part of this Article, I question whether the large num-
ber of independent agencies today is sound.45 So long as we 
have independent agencies, however, both presidents and the 
Senate should exercise great time and care in appointing their 
heads. The President and Congress have little power over weak 
or inept leaders of independent agencies once those leaders 
take office.  
As for judicial appointments, structural considerations fa-
vor a more intensive inquiry by the Senate. Article III judges 
are appointed for life and—unlike executive branch officials—
are not subordinate to their appointing presidents.46 That 
changes the constitutional dynamic.  
The President deserves great deference in the selection of 
his own subordinates—who, after all, must follow the Presi-
dent’s lead and are accountable to the President who is respon-
sible for their actions.47 By contrast, the independence and life 
tenure of federal judges justifies a more searching inquiry by 
the Senate into their fitness and qualifications for office. Be-
cause the stakes in judicial appointments—particularly Su-
preme Court appointments—are higher than in executive 
branch appointments, the constitutional text and structure 
support a more robust role for the Senate in the judicial ap-
pointments process. 
That said, the judicial confirmation process has become 
badly flawed in recent decades. Two aspects of the judicial con-
firmation fights have been contentious—one substantive, the 
 
 44. See Humphrey’s Ex’r v. United States, 295 U.S. 602, 630 (1935).  
 45. See infra Part III. 
 46. See U.S. CONST. art. III; THE FEDERALIST NO. 78 (Alexander Hamil-
ton), supra note 41.  
 47. See U.S. CONST. art. II; THE FEDERALIST NO. 72 (Alexander Hamil-
ton), supra note 41.  
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other procedural. The substantive disputes during judicial con-
firmations are largely inevitable. But the procedural meltdown 
is constitutionally inappropriate and should be fixed. 
Substantively, a debate continues to bubble about whether 
a Supreme Court nominee’s judicial philosophy is a fair basis 
for inquiry by the Senate (and for voting against a nomination), 
or whether the confirmation process should focus only on 
whether a nominee meets objective criteria pertaining to quali-
fications, temperament, ethical propriety, and the like.48  
In recent years, a rough Senate consensus has seemed to 
emerge, as revealed by the last four sets of hearings for Su-
preme Court Justices.49 Many Senators seem to believe that a 
judicial nominee’s general judicial philosophy is appropriate for 
consideration by the President and—with some deference to the 
President—by the Senate as well.50 At the same time, the polit-
ical ideology and policy views of judicial nominees are clearly 
unrelated to their fitness as judges, and those matters there-
fore appear to lie outside the Senate’s legitimate range of in-
quiry.51 It is equally plain that judicial nominees do not have to 
answer substantive questions that might impinge on their abil-
ity to make independent judgments once confirmed. The Senate 
thus has not required nominees to commit themselves—directly 
or indirectly—on particular cases or issues.52 As these confir-
 
 48. See, e.g., Frederick Liu, Comment, The Supreme Court Appointments 
Process and the Real Divide Between Liberals and Conservatives, 117 YALE 
L.J. 1947, 1947–56 (2008). 
 49. See Nomination of Samuel A. Alito, Jr. to Be an Associate Justice of 
the Supreme Court of the United States: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the 
Judiciary, 109th Cong. (2006); Confirmation Hearing on the Nomination of 
John G. Roberts, Jr. to Be Chief Justice of the United States: Hearing Before 
the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th Cong. (2005); Nomination of Stephen G. 
Breyer to Be an Associate Justice of the Supreme Court of the United States: 
Hearings Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 103d Cong. (1995); Nomi-
nation of Ruth Bader Ginsburg to Be Associate Justice of the Supreme Court of 
the United States: Hearings Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 103rd Cong. 
(1993). 
 50. Cf. William H. Rehnquist, The Making of a Supreme Court Justice, 
HARV. L. REC., Oct. 8, 1959, at 7, 10 (“[T]here are additional factors which 
come into play in the exercise of the function of a Supreme Court Justice.”).  
 51. See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2. cl. 2 (Advice and Consent Clause); cf. John 
C. Eastman, The Limited Nature of the Senate’s Advice and Consent Role, 36 
U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 633, 640–47 (2003). 
 52. See Nomination of Ruth Bader Ginsburg to Be Associate Justice of the 
Supreme Court of the United States: Hearings Before the S. Comm. on the Ju-
diciary, 103rd Cong. 259, 287–88 (1993) (statements of Sen. Joseph R. Biden, 
Chairman, S. Comm. on the Judiciary and Judge Ruth Bader Ginsburg) (de-
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mation proceedings showed, notwithstanding some rocky mo-
ments and deviations by individual Senators,53 questions re-
garding general judicial philosophy can shed light on matters 
relevant to judicial decision making and to the Senate’s ulti-
mate decision without threatening judicial independence. 
In short, the current Senate precedents suggest that the 
Senate will consider general judicial philosophy, with some de-
ference to the President. But the precedents also indicate that 
this must be done without impinging on judicial independence.  
Procedurally, however, the judicial confirmation process for 
Court of Appeals nominees has broken down. In recent decades, 
the Senate has increasingly used a multitude of procedural me-
chanisms to delay action on lower-court judicial nominees—by 
home-state senators’ blue-slipping nominees, by bottling them 
up in committee, or by using anonymous “holds.”54 This has 
been a bipartisan problem—perpetrated by Republican sena-
tors on some Clinton appointees, and by Democratic senators 
on some Bush appointees.55 The result has been judicial vacan-
cies left open for years on end, nominees who put their lives on 
hold while waiting for Senate action that may never come, and 
talented lawyers who prefer to remain in other jobs instead of 
subjecting themselves to the whim of the Senate confirmation 
process.56 The judiciary is worse off as a result. 
My idea on this issue is simple, and echoes sentiments ad-
vanced in recent years by President Clinton,57 President 
Bush,58 then-Chief Justice Rehnquist,59 and the American Bar 
 
clining to answer specific questions about some specific past cases on the 
grounds that the legal issues might return to the Supreme Court for decision 
in a future case).  
 53. See sources cited supra note 49. 
 54. See THOMAS E. MANN & NORMAN J. ORNSTEIN, THE BROKEN BRANCH: 
HOW CONGRESS IS FAILING AMERICA AND HOW TO GET IT BACK ON TRACK 
164–68 (2006) (discussing the blue-slip process, “bottling up,” committee 
holds, and filibusters).  
 55. See Sheldon Goldman, Judicial Confirmation Wars: Ideology and the 
Battle for the Federal Courts, 39 U. RICH. L. REV. 871, 889–91 (2005).  
 56. See THE PRESIDENTIAL APPOINTEE INITIATIVE, BROOKINGS INST., TO 
FORM A GOVERNMENT: A BIPARTISAN PLAN TO IMPROVE THE PRESIDENTIAL 
APPOINTMENTS PROCESS 6–7 (2001), http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/Files/ 
rc/papers/2001/0405governance/0405governance.pdf [hereinafter TO FORM A 
GOVERNMENT]. 
 57. See, e.g., President William J. Clinton, President’s Radio Address, su-
pra note 14, at 1442–43. 
 58. See, e.g., President George W. Bush, Remarks on the Judicial Confir-
mation Process, 2 PUB. PAPERS 1929–32 (Oct. 30, 2002). 
 59. See, e.g., William H. Rehnquist, Chief Justice’s 2002 Year-End Report 
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Association,60 among others.61 The Senate should consider a 
rule ensuring that every judicial nominee receives a vote by the 
Senate within 180 days of being nominated by the President. 
Six months is sufficient time for senators to hold hearings, in-
terest groups to register their preferences, and citizens to 
weigh in on the qualifications of a judicial nominee for lifetime 
office. At the end of that time, it seems that senators should 
stand and be counted. If a home-state senator or a group of 
ideologically-committed senators wishes to block a judicial 
nomination, they can do so. But they can do so by persuading 
their colleagues and voting, not through procedural maneuvers. 
In this way, voters can properly hold their senators accounta-
ble, nominees can receive prompt and respectful treatment, and 
key judicial vacancies can be filled without unnecessary delay. 
A related and difficult question—which I do not resolve 
here—is whether votes on judicial nominees must be up-or-
down majority votes, or whether the sixty votes currently 
needed under Senate rules to overcome a filibuster is appropri-
ate for consideration of judges.62 Scholars and politicians have 
argued that constitutional text and historical practice require 
an up-or-down majority vote.63 That said, it is also clear that 
the text of the Constitution gives the Senate broad freedom to 
set its own rules of proceeding.64 And the Senate’s filibuster 
rules have been in place for many years now.65 It is not my 
place to settle that ongoing legal debate. 
 
on the Federal Judiciary, THE THIRD BRANCH, Jan. 2003, at 1, available at 
http://www.uscourts.gov/ttb/jan03ttb/jan03.html. 
 60. See AM. BAR ASS’N, INDEPENDENCE OF THE JUDICIARY: JUDICIAL VA-
CANCIES (2003), http://www.abanet.org/poladv/priorities/judvac.html.  
 61. See TO FORM A GOVERNMENT, supra note 56, at 13–14.  
 62. See John Cornyn, Our Broken Judicial Confirmation Process and the 
Need for Filibuster Reform, 27 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 181,182–90 (2003); Ca-
therine Fisk & Erwin Chemerinsky, The Filibuster, 49 STAN. L. REV. 181, 239–
45 (1997); Laura T. Gorjanc, Comment, The Solution to the Filibuster Problem: 
Putting the Advice Back in Advice and Consent, 54 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 1435, 
1454–57 (2004). 
 63. See, e.g., Judicial Nominations, Filibusters, and the Constitution: 
When a Majority is Denied Its Right to Consent: Hearing Before the Subcomm. 
on the Constitution, Civil Rights and Property Rights of the S. Comm. on the 
Judiciary, 108th Cong. 1–5, 22–26, 31–46 (2003) (statements of Sen. John 
Cornyn, Professor Steven Calabresi, Professor John Eastman, Professor Bruce 
Fein, and Professor Douglas Kmiec). 
 64. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 5, cl. 2. 
 65. See Martin B. Gold & Dimple Gupta, The Constitutional Option to 
Change Senate Rules and Procedures: A Majoritarian Means to Over Come the 
Filibuster, 28 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 205, 213–60 (2004) (discussing the his-
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Regardless of whether there is a fifty-one-vote or sixty-vote 
or some other numerical vote requirement, a good way to alle-
viate the judicial confirmations mess66 and help fix Washington 
is to agree on the ground rules, make them known to all parties 
ahead of time, and allow nominees to receive votes in the full 
Senate within 180 days.67 Over the long run, the presidency, 
the Senate, and the Judiciary would all benefit from fixed 
ground rules regarding judicial nominations. The forty-fourth 
President (like the forty-second and forty-third presidents tried 
to do before him) and the Senate should work together to solve 
this procedural problem and fix the ground rules not just for 
the forty-fourth President but for the foreseeable future.  
III.  STREAMLINE EXECUTIVE BRANCH ORGANIZATION 
AND ENSURE THAT OFFICIALS IN INDEPENDENT 
AGENCIES ARE MORE ACCOUNTABLE   
Third, Congress and the President should scrutinize the 
organizational chart of executive branch agencies, with an eye 
toward serious reform. The disastrous consequences of some of 
the highest-profile agency failures in recent years—the CIA’s 
mistaken assessment of Saddam Hussein’s weapons programs 
in 2002,68 FEMA’s breakdown during Hurricane Katrina,69 and 
the apparent failure of financial regulatory agencies in the run-
up to the current economic crisis—only confirm the pressing 
nature of the problem. 
Two aspects of this regulatory regime are in particular 
need of attention. The first is the extraordinary duplication, 
 
tory of the filibuster and periodic efforts to reform or restrict its availability). 
 66. See STEPHEN L. CARTER, THE CONFIRMATION MESS: CLEANING UP THE 
FEDERAL APPOINTMENTS PROCESS 3–155 (1994) (describing the current criti-
cisms of the federal judicial nominations process); BENJAMIN WITTES, CON-
FIRMATION WARS: PRESERVING INDEPENDENT COURTS IN ANGRY TIMES 37–85 
(2006) (same). 
 67. President Bush, among others, argued that a failure to vote on a judi-
cial nominee is an abdication of the Senate’s constitutional responsibility. See, 
e.g., President George W. Bush, Remarks at the Federalist Society’s 25th An-
nual Gala (Nov. 15, 2007), http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/ 
releases/2007/11/20071115-14.html. 
 68. See COMM’N ON THE INTELLIGENCE CAPABILITIES OF THE U.S. RE-
GARDING WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION, REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE 
UNITED STATES 3 (2005). 
 69. See OFFICE OF INSPECTIONS & SPECIAL REVIEWS, DEP’T OF HOMELAND 
SEC., A PERFORMANCE REVIEW OF FEMA’S DISASTER MANAGEMENT ACTIVI-
TIES IN RESPONSE TO HURRICANE KATRINA 109–10 (2006), available at 
http://www.dhs.gov/xoig/assets/mgmtrpts/OIG_06-32_Mar06.pdf. 
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overlap, and confusion among the missions of different agen-
cies.70 Whether it is the Justice Department’s Antitrust Divi-
sion overlapping with the Federal Trade Commission,71 the 
Commerce Department overlapping with the Federal Commu-
nications Commission,72 the Department of Energy overlapping 
with the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission,73 the De-
partment of Labor overlapping with the National Labor Rela-
tions Board,74 the Securities and Exchange Commission over-
lapping with the Commodities Futures Trading Commission 
and the Treasury Department,75 or the FBI overlapping with 
the Drug Enforcement Agency,76 there are problems wherever 
one looks. Overlapping responsibilities means redundancy, in-
efficiency, conflict, and unnecessary finger-pointing.  
 
 70. For one official’s views on the problem, see The Charlie Rose Show: 
Interview with Nate Silver, Charles Schumer, David Brooks (PBS television 
broadcast Oct. 31, 2008), available at http://www.charlierose.com/view/ 
interview/9333. (quoting Senator Charles Schumer as saying: “[W]e need to 
have a better system of regulation. No question about it. I believe we need a 
unitary, strong, quieter regulator. Right now the system is a mess. . . . [T]he 
bottom line is we have [thirty] different regulatory agencies . . . . I’m talking 
about one regulator as opposed to thirty . . . .”). 
 71. Cf. Eric Lichtblau, Antitrust Report Exposes Rift Between U.S. Agen-
cies, INT’L HERALD TRIB. (Paris), Sept. 10, 2008, at 16 (discussing a rift be-
tween the two departments on antitrust policy). 
 72. See U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, TELECOMMUNICATIONS: COMPE-
TITION ISSUES IN INTERNATIONAL SATELLITE COMMUNICATIONS 3 (1996) (stat-
ing that the Commerce Department, State Department and the FCC all have 
authority over satellite communications); Joel R. Reidenberg, Governing Net-
works and Rule-Making in Cyberspace, 45 EMORY L.J. 911, 922 (1996) (stating 
that several federal agencies, including the FCC and the Commerce Depart-
ment, have “overlapping” authority over information policy). 
 73. See, e.g., Norman L. Rave., Jr., Note, Interagency Conflict and Admin-
istrative Accountability: Regulating the Release of Recombinant Organisms, 77 
GEO. L.J. 1787, 1809 (1989) (“[F]ive agencies (NRC, Department of the Inte-
rior, Department of Energy, Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, EPA) 
with widely differing agendas have control over the intersection of environ-
mental and energy policy.”). 
 74. See Valerie A. Sanchez, A New Look at ADR in New Deal Labor Law 
Enforcement: The Emergence of a Dispute Processing Continuum Under The 
Wagner Act, 20 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 621, 655–59 (2005) (discussing 
concerns about overlaps between the Department of Labor and the NLRB dat-
ing from the creation of the NLRB). 
 75. See JERRY W. MARKHAM, 1 A FINANCIAL HISTORY OF THE UNITED 
STATES 82 (2002). 
 76. See Kathleen F. Brickey, Criminal Mischief: The Federalization of 
American Criminal Law, 46 HASTINGS L.J. 1135, 1151 (1995) (discussing the 
overlapping jurisdiction between the FBI, DEA, and other agencies during the 
“War on Drugs.”). 
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A second, related area of concern is the questionable effec-
tiveness and accountability of some of the numerous indepen-
dent regulatory agencies.77 These agencies are freed by statute 
and tradition from direct control by the President or others in 
the White House and traditional executive agencies.78 The 
President appoints the members of these independent agen-
cies,79 but after that, he exercises minimal control over them 
and can fire them only for cause.80 The Supreme Court has 
made fairly clear (albeit not crystal clear) that the for-cause 
standard is hard to meet,81 and therefore presidents rarely at-
tempt to fire officials in independent agencies even when they 
under-perform. Indeed, presidents rarely attempt to assert any 
significant direction and supervision over independent agency 
heads as they exert their policymaking authority.82 Although 
some legal scholars posit that presidents really do exert some 
 
 77. For an effort to list all of the independent agencies, see Marshall J. 
Breger & Gary J. Edles, Established by Practice: The Theory and Operation of 
Independent Federal Agencies, 52 ADMIN. L. REV. 1111, app. at 1236–94 
(2000), which includes the following agencies: the Board of Governors of the 
Federal Reserve System, the Board of Veterans’ Appeals, the Chemical Safety 
and Hazard Investigation Board, the Commodity Futures Trading Commis-
sion, the Consumer Product Safety Commission, the Defense Nuclear Facili-
ties Safety Board, the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, the Farm 
Credit Administration, the Federal Communications Commission, the Federal 
Deposit Insurance Corporation, the Federal Election Commission, the Federal 
Energy Regulatory Commission, the Federal Housing Finance Board, the Fed-
eral Labor Relations Authority, the Federal Maritime Commission, the Feder-
al Mine Safety and Health Review Commission, the Federal Trade Commis-
sion, the Merit Systems Protection Board, the National Credit Union 
Administration, the National Indian Gaming Commission, the National Labor 
Relations Board, the National Mediation Board, the National Transportation 
Safety Board, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, the Occupational Safety 
and Health Review Commission, the Postal Rate Commission, the Railroad 
Retirement Board, the Securities and Exchange Commission, the Surface 
Transportation Board, the United States International Trade Commission, the 
Social Security Administration, and the Office of Special Counsel.  
 78. See Humphrey’s Ex’r v. United States, 295 U.S. 602, 628–30 (1935); cf. 
Thomas O. Sargentich, The Emphasis on the Presidency in U.S. Public Law: 
An Essay Critiquing Presidential Administration, 59 ADMIN. L. REV. 1, 15 
(2007). 
 79. Cf. Anne Joseph O’Connell, Political Cycles of Rulemaking: An Empir-
ical Portrait of the Modern Administrative State, 94 VA. L. REV. 889, 898–99 
(2008). 
 80. Id. at 984. 
 81. See Humphrey’s Ex’r, 295 U.S. at 629–30. 
 82. Cf. Harold H. Bruff, Specialized Courts in Administrative Law, 43 
ADMIN. L. REV. 329, 350 (1991) (“Presidents rarely remove these commission-
ers . . . [and] potent factors deter active presidential supervision and remov-
al.”). 
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level of control over independent agencies through indirect me-
chanisms,83 those who have worked in a White House tend to 
agree that a President exercises far less practical control over 
independent agency heads than over the leaders of traditional 
executive agencies who are removable at will.84 
Independent agencies are constitutional under Humphrey’s 
Executor v. United States.85 But what is constitutional is not 
always wise. And there is reason to doubt whether the elabo-
rate system of numerous independent agencies makes full 
sense today, at least as to the rulemaking and enforcement ac-
tivities at certain agencies, as opposed to their adjudicatory 
functions. The independence those agencies enjoy from presi-
dential direction and supervision may weaken the Executive 
and strengthen Congress’s hand in the Washington power 
game. But this independence has clear costs in terms of demo-
cratic accountability. The basic question is this: Should the 
President direct and manage some of what now are “indepen-
dent” agencies in the same way that he controls other agen-
cies—by directing and supervising agency heads in their duties 
and removing them at will for any reason at all? 
I recently watched a CNN telecast that illustrated this is-
sue of accountability: the show purported to identify people re-
sponsible for the current financial meltdown—“naming names,” 
in the words of the program’s anchor.86 Among those identified 
were current or former heads of independent agencies.87 These 
individuals, like all independent agency heads, necessarily op-
erated without meaningful substantive direction or supervision 
by the President. They could operate their own fiefdoms with 
 
 83. See, e.g., Peter L. Strauss, The Place of Agencies in Government: Sepa-
ration of Powers and the Fourth Branch, 84 COLUM. L. REV. 573, 596 (1984) 
(“[A]ny assumption that executive agencies and independent regulatory com-
missions differ significantly or systematically in function, internal or external 
procedures, or relationships with the rest of government is misplaced.”). 
 84. See, e.g., Elena Kagan, Presidential Administration, 114 HARV. L. 
REV. 2245, 2273–74 (2001) (“[T]he existence of independent agencies can pose 
a particularly stark challenge to the aspiration of Presidents to control admin-
istration.”). 
 85. 295 U.S. 602, 628 (1935) (characterizing the Federal Trade Commis-
sion as a valid “administrative body”). 
 86. Anderson Cooper 360 Degrees (CNN television broadcast Oct. 20, 2008) 
(transcript available at http://transcripts.cnn.com/TRANSCRIPTS/0810/20/ 
acd.02.html).  
 87. See id. (listing the former SEC chairman and the former chairman of 
the Federal Reserve Board of Governors as “culprits of the collapse”). 
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little regard to what the President might have thought was the 
right approach.  
Perhaps the most interesting illustration of this problem 
occurred when Senator and then-presidential-candidate John 
McCain called for the firing of the SEC Chairman.88 Some im-
mediately responded that the President has no power to fire the 
SEC Chairman,89 prompting Senator McCain to quickly back 
down from his proposal.90 But was Senator McCain’s suggestion 
so unthinkable? Let us assume for a minute that the chair of an 
independent agency has exercised his or her rulemaking or en-
forcement authority in a way that is ethically and legally per-
missible but simply turns out to be unwise and causes great 
harm. Should that official be subject to removal? What if the 
agency head is mediocre or just average at his or her job? Nor-
mally, persons exercising tremendous executive power and re-
sponsibility are not insulated from direction, supervision, and 
ultimately (if necessary) dismissal, either by elected officials or 
by the people themselves. Why shouldn’t someone have the au-
thority to fire such persons at will? And if anyone is to possess 
that power, it must be the President. Why is it that the Presi-
dent should not have the power, in the first place, to direct and 
supervise that independent agency head in the exercise of his 
or her authority?91  
When presidential candidates criss-cross the country for 
two years, engage in endless town halls, speeches, and debates, 
the people expect that the leader they elect will actually have 
the authority to execute the laws, as prescribed by the Consti-
tution.92 Yet that is not the way the system works now for large 
swaths of American economic and domestic policy, including 
energy regulation,93 labor law,94 telecommunications,95 securi-
 
 88. Carrie Johnson, Crisis Poses Big Test for Markets’ Regulator, WASH. 
POST, Sept. 19, 2008, at D1 (noting that Sen. McCain said that if he were Pres-
ident, he would fire the SEC Chairman).  
 89. See, e.g., Posting of David Wright to Political Radar, McCain Flub? 
Republican Says He’d Fire SEC Chair as President, http://blogs.abcnews 
.com/politicalradar/2008/09/mccain-blasts-o.html (Sept. 18, 2008, 13:47 EST). 
 90. See Posting of Jake Tapper to Political Punch, http://blogs.abcnews 
.com/politicalpunch/2008/09/mccain-says-he.html (Sept. 21, 2008, 20:18 EST). 
 91. Cf. Les Carpenter, No Cheering in the Press Box, Except When It 
Comes to the Boss, WASH. POST, Jan. 30, 2009, at E6 (quoting Bruce 
Springsteen discussing his choice of songs for the Super Bowl XLIII halftime 
show: “I’m the Boss! I decide. The Boss decides. Other people suggest or cajole, 
but I decide.”). 
 92. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1. 
 93. See 42 U.S.C. § 7171 (2006) (“There is hereby established within the 
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ties regulation,96 and other major sectors97 where the President 
has little direct role in rulemaking and enforcement actions, 
despite those functions being part of the executive power vested 
in the President by the Constitution. In short, the President is 
vested with the executive power and yet actually exercises a 
relatively small slice of that power in certain critical areas of 
domestic policy. 
To be sure, in some situations it may be worthwhile to in-
sulate particular agencies from direct presidential oversight or 
control—the Federal Reserve Board may be one example, due 
to its power to directly affect the short-term functioning of the 
U.S. economy by setting interest rates and adjusting the money 
supply.98 It is possible to make a similar case, on similar 
grounds, for exempting other agencies from direct presidential 
control, and it also makes sense generally to treat administra-
tive adjudications differently from policy decisions, rulemak-
ings, and enforcement actions. Yet independent agencies argu-
ably should be more the exception, as they are in considerable 
tension with our nation’s longstanding belief in accountability 
and the Framers’ understanding that one person would be re-
sponsible for the executive power.99 At a minimum, the implica-
tion of affording independence to such agencies should be care-
fully re-examined to avoid creating overlaps between 
independent and non-independent agencies for no apparent 
reason.100  
 
Department an independent regulatory commission to be known as the Feder-
al Energy Regulatory Commission.”). 
 94. See National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 151–169 (2006) (estab-
lishing the NLRB as an independent agency to regulate aspects of labor law). 
 95. See Communications Act of 1934 § 4, 47 U.S.C. § 154 (2006) (establish-
ing the Federal Communications Commission as an independent agency to re-
gulate telecommunications). 
 96. See Freytag v. Commissioner, 501 U.S. 868, 916 (Scalia, J., concur-
ring) (listing the Securities and Exchange Commission as an “independent 
regulatory agency”). 
 97. See supra note 77 and accompanying text. 
 98. BD. OF GOVERNORS OF THE FED. RESERVE SYS., THE FEDERAL RE-
SERVE SYSTEM PURPOSES AND FUNCTIONS 5 (8th ed. 1994). 
 99. THE FEDERALIST NOS. 69, 70 (Alexander Hamilton).  
 100. See Neal Devins, Unitariness and Independence: Solicitor General 
Control over Independent Agency Litigation, 82 CAL. L. REV. 255, 322 (1994) 
(“On matters of substance, for example, regulation of the banking industry, 
antitrust enforcement, and employment discrimination prosecutions are con-
currently managed by both the executive and independent agencies.”). 
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The related problems of overlapping responsibilities and 
excessive insulation from presidential (and hence democratic) 
control call out for high-level attention. Congress and the ad-
ministration should seek to better organize the executive 
branch, eliminating overlapping responsibilities, and ensuring 
that public officials are properly accountable to the President 
and therefore to the American people. Of course, not all of the 
problems with agency overlap and independent agencies can or 
should be solved at once. And Washington is notorious for mov-
ing at a glacial pace on these kinds of structural issues. But 
piecemeal reform is usually better than no reform at all. And 
the costs of the status quo are a significant contributor to the 
perception and reality that “Washington is broken.” 
IV.  RECOGNIZE THAT BOTH THE LEGISLATIVE AND 
EXECUTIVE BRANCHES HAVE LEGITIMATE AND 
SOMETIMES OVERLAPPING ROLES IN WAR AND 
NATIONAL SECURITY   
Fourth, in the arena of separation of powers law, one issue 
looms in significance well above all others: the question of war 
powers. The most significant issue is whether the President can 
order U.S. troops to initiate large-scale offensive hostilities in a 
foreign country without congressional approval.101 Despite its 
obvious import, I was amazed that the recent presidential and 
vice-presidential televised debates lasted a combined six hours 
without even one question about whether, and if so when, the 
President can commit the United States to war without prior 
approval from Congress.102 One would expect that this would be 
 
 101. This topic has been the subject of considerable academic debate in re-
cent decades. See generally JOHN HART ELY, WAR AND RESPONSIBILITY: CON-
STITUTIONAL LESSONS OF VIETNAM AND ITS AFTERMATH (1993); LOUIS FISHER, 
PRESIDENTIAL WAR POWER (2d rev. ed. 2004); MICHAEL GLENNON, CONSTITU-
TIONAL DIPLOMACY (1990); LOUIS HENKIN, CONSTITUTIONALISM, DEMOCRACY, 
AND FOREIGN AFFAIRS (1990); MICHAEL D. RAMSEY, THE CONSTITUTION’S 
TEXT IN FOREIGN AFFAIRS (2007); Robert J. Delahunty & John C. Yoo, The 
President’s Constitutional Authority to Conduct Military Operations Against 
Terrorist Organizations and the Nations That Harbor or Support Them, 25 
HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 487 (2002); Saikrishna Prakash, Unleashing the Dogs 
of War: What the Constitution Means by “Declare War,” 93 CORNELL L. REV. 45 
(2007). 
 102. See The First Presidential Debate (CNN television broadcast Sept. 26, 
2008); The Second Presidential Debate (CNN television broadcast Oct. 7, 
2008); The Third Presidential Debate (CNN television broadcast Oct. 15, 
2008); The Vice-Presidential Debate (CNN television broadcast Oct. 2, 2008) 
(providing question-by-question accounts of the televised debates and indicat-
ing that such questions were never asked). A version of this question was put 
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a critically important question to be asked of a presidential 
candidate given our history and the President’s singular consti-
tutional role as commander in chief, yet the question was never 
posed during the debates.103  
The Constitution grants Congress the power to declare 
war.104 The War Powers Resolution requires congressional au-
thorization of a war within sixty days of hostilities, except in 
cases of self-defense and similar emergencies.105 Before and af-
ter the War Powers Resolution was enacted in the early 1970s, 
however, most presidents asserted their ability to wage war—
at least limited war—without any such congressional approv-
al.106 On some occasions involving more limited strikes—the 
 
to Governor Mitt Romney in a Republican presidential primary debate on Oc-
tober 9, 2007. Asked whether he would need congressional authorization “to 
take military action against Iran’s nuclear facilities,” Governor Romney did 
not directly answer the question, noting that as President “[y]ou sit down with 
your attorneys and [they] tell you what you have to do;” he then proceeded to 
discuss the substance of his Iran policy. MSNBC.com, Oct. 9 Republican De-
bate Transcript, http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/21309530 (last visited Apr. 12, 
2009). Senator John McCain later criticized Governor Romney’s answer for 
suggesting that lawyers should be involved in making such a determination. 
SCHotline, http://schotlinepress.wordpress.com/2008/01/06/john-mccain-2008-
launches-new-web-ad-leadership (Jan. 6, 2008, 08:45 EST) (giving the script 
for John McCain’s web advertisement entitled “Leadership”). 
 103. Cf. The First Presidential Debate, supra note 102; The Second Presi-
dential Debate, supra note 102; The Third Presidential Debate, supra note 102; 
The Vice-Presidential Debate, supra note 102 (indicating that this question 
was not asked). In contrast to the paucity of questions on these matters during 
the televised debates, Boston Globe reporter Charlie Savage asked the leading 
primary candidates of both parties a detailed set of questions concerning their 
views of executive power, especially in wartime. See Charlie Savage, Candi-
dates on Executive Power: A Full Spectrum, BOSTON GLOBE, Dec. 22, 2007, at 
A1. Then-Senator Barack Obama stated during the Democratic primary cam-
paign that “[t]he President does not have power under the Constitution to un-
ilaterally authorize a military attack in a situation that does not involve stop-
ping an actual or imminent threat to the nation.” Charlie Savage, Barack 
Obama’s Q&A, BOSTON GLOBE, Dec. 20, 2007, http://www.boston.com/news/ 
politics/2008/specials/CandidateQA/ObamaQA. 
 104. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 11. 
 105. War Powers Resolution, 50 U.S.C. §§ 1541–1548 (2000). 
 106. See, e.g., William J. Clinton, The President’s News Conference, 2 PUB. 
PAPERS 1417, 1419 (Aug. 3, 1994) (quoting then-President Clinton as “wel-
com[ing] the support of the Congress” to invade Haiti but stating that “[l]ike 
my predecessors of both parties, I have not agreed that I was constitutionally 
mandated to get it”); James A. Baker III & Warren Christopher, Op-Ed., Put 
War Powers Back Where They Belong, N.Y. TIMES, July 8, 2008, at A21 
(“[E]very president since Richard Nixon has treated [the War Powers Resolu-
tion] as unconstitutional . . . .”); THE CONSTITUTION PROJECT, DECIDING TO 
USE FORCE ABROAD: WAR POWERS IN A SYSTEM OF CHECKS AND BALANCES, at 
viii (2005), http://www.constitutionproject.org/pdf/War_Powers_Deciding_To_ 
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invasions of Grenada in 1983 and Panama in 1989; the tar-
geted missile strikes on Iraq, Afghanistan, and Sudan in the 
1990s; and the broader air campaign against Kosovo in 1999—
modern presidents have conducted offensive military opera-
tions without obtaining advance approval from Congress.107 
With regard to larger conflicts—most notably the Persian Gulf 
War of 1991, the Afghan War (and broader war against al Qae-
da) in 2001, and the Iraq War of 2003—modern presidents have 
sought advance authorization from Congress before acting.108 
As the actions of these presidents suggest, it is ordinarily 
understood that seeking the approval of Congress for large-
scale military operations overseas is a wise presidential course. 
Going to war is the most grave and significant action a nation 
 
Use_Force_Abroad.pdf (“Since [the passage of the War Powers Resolution], 
presidents have consistently maintained that parts of the Resolution intrude 
unconstitutionally on the President’s war powers.”). Senior members of Con-
gress have at times explicitly agreed with this proposition. See, e.g., 144 CONG. 
REC. H11,722 (daily ed. Dec. 17, 1998) (statement of Rep. Gingrich) (seeing no 
need for President Clinton to obtain advance authorization from Congress be-
fore launching military strikes against Iraq); 141 CONG. REC. S17,529 (daily 
ed. Nov. 27, 1995) (statement of Sen. Dole) (“Now, in my view the President 
has the authority and the power under the Constitution to do what he feels 
should be done regardless of what Congress does.”).  
 107. See Andrew Rudalevige, The Contemporary Presidency: The Decline 
and Resurgence and Decline (and Resurgence?) of Congress: Charting a New 
Imperial Presidency, 36 PRESIDENTIAL STUD. Q. 506, 510 (2006) (noting uses of 
force without congressional authorization in Lebanon, Iran, Grenada, Libya, 
Panama, Somalia, Iraq, Haiti, Bosnia, Sudan, Afghanistan, and Kosovo). 
 108. The broader historical practice of seeking congressional approval is 
hard to assess, and would depend largely on one’s definition of “war.” The 
United States has “utilized military abroad in situations of military conflict to 
protect U.S. citizens or promote U.S. interests” hundreds of times. RICHARD F. 
GRIMMET, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., INSTANCES OF USE OF UNITED STATES 
ARMED FORCES ABROAD, 1798–2008, at 1 (2009), available at http://www 
.fas.org/sgp/crs/natsec/RL32170.pdf. The U.S. has formally declared war on 
five occasions, including the War of 1812, the Mexican-American War, the 
Spanish-American War, World War I, and World War II. See John C. Yoo, The 
Continuation of Politics by Other Means: The Original Understanding of War 
Powers, 84 CAL. L. REV. 167, 177 (1996). Congress has specifically authorized 
war (without a formal declaration) in other cases, including the naval war 
with France in the 1790s, the Barbary wars of the early 19th century, the 
Vietnam War, the Persian Gulf Wars of 1991 and 2003, and the War on Ter-
ror. See id. (asserting that the war with France, the Vietnam War, and the 
Persian Gulf War of 1991 were each authorized by Congress without a formal 
declaration); Bradley & Goldsmith, supra note 15, at 2050, 2074, 2076 (2005) 
(speaking to the 2003 war in the Persian Gulf, the War on Terror, and the 
Barbary wars). Lack of an advance congressional authorization vote has not 
prevented U.S. presidents from using military force abroad, however, most 
notably in the Korean War, the invasions of Grenada and Panama, and the 
Kosovo War. See supra note 107 and accompanying text. 
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can take. As a political and policy matter, it makes sense for 
there to be an inter-branch consensus among our federal 
elected officials, as there was (at least initially) for both the 
Afghan and the Iraq wars.109 Such consensus maximizes public 
and political support for the war effort while minimizing the 
risk that war will be undertaken hastily without proper consid-
eration. Even more importantly, inter-branch agreement is fa-
vored—and according to some, compelled—by the Constitution 
itself,110 in addition to the War Powers Resolution.111 As even 
the most energetic defenders of executive prerogatives agree, 
moreover, Congress has unambiguous power over appropriat-
ing money to fund military conflicts, in addition to its other au-
thorities over military matters.112 No one denies, therefore, that 
Congress can stop a President from waging war by, at a mini-
 
 109. See 148 CONG. REC. H7799 (daily ed. Oct. 10, 2002) (listing a vote in 
the House of 296 to 133 to authorize military action in Iraq, with bipartisan 
support); 148 CONG. REC. S10342 (daily ed. Oct. 10 2002) (listing a vote in the 
Senate of seventy-seven to twenty-three to authorize military action in Iraq, 
with bipartisan support); 147 CONG. REC. S9421 (daily ed. Sept. 14, 2001) (list-
ing a vote in the U.S. Senate of ninety-eight to zero for the AUMF); 147 CONG. 
REC. H5683 (daily ed. Sept. 14, 2001) (listing a vote in the House of 420 to one 
for the AUMF).  
 110. See U.S.CONST. art I, § 8, cl. 11; cf. GLENNON, supra note 101, at 72 
(asserting that the President’s war powers are “paltry” and “subordinate to” 
the constitutional war powers granted to Congress). 
 111. The War Powers Resolution ironically may give the President more 
power to initiate war unilaterally than some believe is granted by the Consti-
tution. Whereas the Constitution grants Congress the power to “declare war,” 
which some argue means congressional authorization is required before mili-
tary operations other than those undertaken in self-defense, the War Powers 
Resolution requires affirmative congressional authorization for a war only if 
the conflict lasts more than sixty days—a time period which can be extended 
by Congress. See U.S. CONST. art. I § 8, cl. 11; War Powers Resolution, 50 
U.S.C. § 1544(b) (2000). This is not the forum in which to address how a court 
should necessarily rule on war powers questions, or even whether such ques-
tions are justiciable. Courts could conceivably address such questions in a 
number of ways, including: (1) deciding the issue to be a non-justiciable politi-
cal question; (2) requiring explicit congressional authorization before the Pres-
ident can initiate war; (3) allowing the President to initiate war unilaterally, 
unless Congress has explicitly voted otherwise; (4) allowing the President to 
initiate war unilaterally, even in the face of an explicit negative congressional 
vote; and (5) treating the congressional appropriations process as the sole me-
chanism by which Congress can itself police the President and halt or prevent 
undesired wars. See Campbell v. Clinton, 203 F.3d 19, 20, 23 (D.C. Cir. 2000) 
for an example of a court grappling with a war powers issue.  
 112. See, e.g., JOHN YOO, THE POWERS OF WAR AND PEACE: THE CONSTITU-
TION AND FOREIGN AFFAIRS AFTER 9/11, at 143 (2005); see also U.S. CONST. 
art. I, § 9, cl. 7 (giving Congress the power to appropriate funds); id. art I, § 8 
cls. 11–14 (providing further congressional powers over war-related functions). 
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mum, refusing to fund the war (although in some cases that 
may require two-thirds of both Houses to overcome a veto).113 
Given that war powers are thus shared by both the President 
and Congress—and that unity of national effort is crucial for a 
war effort to succeed—most presidents and observers have seen 
it as vastly preferable for the President to obtain congressional 
approval before initiating large-scale military conflict. 
But beyond the question of going to war in the first place 
are many subsidiary questions involving the relative roles of 
the President and Congress with respect to the “incident[s] of 
war.”114 To what extent can the Congress legislate and regulate 
the President’s activities in the war arena? And to what extent 
does the President require authorizing legislation to undertake 
a war-related activity abroad? 
As an initial matter, the constitutional text makes clear 
that the President does not enjoy unilateral authority with re-
spect to all incidents of war. The Constitution gives the Con-
gress not only the power to declare war, as discussed above, but 
also the power to raise armies, to fund wars and armies, and to 
regulate captures, among other powers.115 In addition, Article I, 
Section Eight gives Congress the power to “make all Laws 
which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into Execution 
the foregoing Powers, and all other Powers vested by this Con-
stitution in the Government of the United States, or in any De-
partment or Officer thereof.”116 
Justice Jackson’s three-part framework from his concur-
rence in Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer117 has long 
been used to assess whether a President’s activities in the na-
tional security arena are permissible. Justice Jackson famously 
separated the exercise of a President’s wartime authorities into 
three categories. Category One applies when Congress has au-
thorized the President’s actions, and his authority is thus “at 
its maximum.”118 Category Two occurs when Congress has nei-
ther authorized nor prohibited the President’s actions.119 Cate-
gory Three applies when Congress has prohibited the Presi-
 
 113. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7, cl. 2. 
 114. Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 519 (2004) (internal quotations 
omitted). 
 115. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cls. 11–12. 
 116. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 18. 
 117. 343 U.S. 579, 634 (1952) (Jackson, J., concurring). 
 118. Id. at 635. 
 119. Id. at 637. 
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dent’s actions, but the President asserts his preclusive and ex-
clusive commander-in-chief authority.120 Here, Jackson main-
tains, the President’s power is “at its lowest ebb.”121 
The scope of what a President can lawfully do in a Catego-
ry Three situation is uncertain—and highly controversial with 
Congress and the public.122 For that reason, it seems preferable 
for a President to try to ensure where possible that his com-
mander-in-chief activities take place in Category One or Two. 
In other words, if it appears that the President’s activities may 
run counter to an existing statute, the President may be wise to 
seek clarifying legislation or commentary from Congress, a 
point Jack Goldsmith articulated in his thought-provoking 
book, The Terror Presidency.123 Outside perhaps of a few de-
fined areas (such as command of troop movements in battle) in 
which preclusive and exclusive presidential war-making au-
thority appears settled as a matter of history and tradition, it is 
not likely a winning strategy—in this era of continued aggres-
sive judicial involvement in separation of powers disputes—for 
a President to assume that he will be able to avoid judicial dis-
approval of wartime activities taken in contravention of a fed-
eral statute.124 Recent years have demonstrated that courts are 
quite prepared to resolve war-related separation of powers dis-
putes.125 
In applying Justice Jackson’s Youngstown framework, 
courts have a corresponding responsibility to ensure that their 
opinions are especially clear and provide necessary guidance to 
the political branches. One major issue in recent years, for ex-
ample, has been whether the broad language of the Authoriza-
 
 120. Id. at 637–38. 
 121. Id. at 637. 
 122. Cf. David J. Barron & Martin S. Lederman, The Commander in Chief 
at the Lowest Ebb—Framing the Problem, Doctrine, and Original Understand-
ing, 121 HARV. L. REV. 689, 720–21 (2008) (stating that Category Three dis-
putes are “central to the modern law of war powers”). 
 123. JACK GOLDSMITH, THE TERROR PRESIDENCY: LAW AND JUDGMENT IN-
SIDE THE BUSH ADMINISTRATION 124 (2007). 
 124. But see In re Sealed Case, 310 F.3d 717, 746 (FISA Ct. Rev. 2002). 
 125. See, e.g., Boumediene v. Bush, 128 S.Ct. 2229, 2259 (2008); Hamdan v. 
Rumsfeld, 126 S.Ct. 2749, 2762 (2006), superseded by statute, Military Com-
missions Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-366, 120 Stat. 2600, as recognized in 
Boumediene v. Bush, 128 S.Ct. 2229 (2008); Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 
535 (2004); Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466, 485 (2004), superseded by statute, De-
tainee Treatment Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-148, 119 Stat. 2739. 
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tion for the Use of Military Force,126 passed in the wake of Sep-
tember 11, overrides more specific earlier-enacted statutes such 
as the Non-Detention Act,127 the Uniform Code of Military Jus-
tice,128 and the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act.129 Argua-
bly, the Supreme Court has sent mixed signals on that ques-
tion, reading the AUMF broadly in Hamdi130 and then two 
years later reading it more narrowly in Hamdan.131 This led to 
complaints by the Hamdan dissenters that the Court was read-
ing the AUMF inconsistently.132 Without taking sides in the 
debate over whether the AUMF should have been read broadly 
or narrowly in connection with its effect on earlier enacted sta-
tutes, or whether the critique offered by the Hamdan dissen-
ters is correct, it is enough here to say that courts owe a special 
duty of consistency and clarity when they decide cases in the 
war powers arena, including when they interpret landmark 
statutes such as the AUMF. 
In that same vein, courts today should be cautious about 
finding implied congressional prohibition sufficient to classify a 
case as a Category Three situation. Modern statutory interpre-
tation generally frowns on drawing inferences from congres-
sional silence—recognizing that there are many reasons Con-
gress might not enact a particular bill into law.133 It is arguably 
even less appropriate, moreover, for a court to disallow a Presi-
dent’s traditional wartime activity solely on the basis of con-
gressional silence, rather than a written statute. To be sure, in 
Youngstown itself, some Justices drew meaning from the fail-
ure of Congress to enact a statute supporting President Tru-
man’s seizure; they read the congressional silence against 
 
 126. Pub. L. No. 107-40, 115 Stat. 224 (2001) (codified at 50 U.S.C. § 1541 
(Supp. I 2001)). 
 127. 18 U.S.C. § 4001(a) (2006). 
 128. 10 U.S.C. §§ 801–946 (2006). 
 129. Pub. L. No. 95-511, 92 Stat. 1783 (codified as amended in scattered 
sections of 50 U.S.C.). 
 130. Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 517. Justice Souter dissented as to this broad 
reading. Id. at 547 (Souter, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part, and con-
curring in the judgment). 
 131. See Hamdan, 126 S.Ct. at 2775. Justice Thomas would have read the 
Authorization more broadly. See id. at 2775 n.24. 
 132. See Hamdan, 126 S.Ct. at 2824–25 (Thomas, J., dissenting). 
 133. See, e.g., Kimbrough v. United States, 128 S.Ct. 558, 561 (2007) (“The 
statute says nothing about appropriate sentences within these brackets, and 
this Court declines to read any implicit directive into the congressional si-
lence.”). 
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him.134 But Youngstown is not a counter-example to the point 
because in that case the President’s domestic action was not a 
traditional commander-in-chief activity to begin with—as both 
Justice Black’s majority opinion and Justice Jackson’s concur-
ring opinion convincingly explained.135 When, unlike in 
Youngstown, it is clear that the President is exercising his tra-
ditional commander-in-chief power and directing action to sup-
port a war effort, it appears more consistent with modern prin-
ciples of statutory interpretation and judicial restraint for 
courts to require express congressional prohibition before classi-
fying the case as a Category Three situation. 
In sum, a President must thoroughly understand and ap-
preciate the significance of Youngstown Category Three. And a 
President should strive to avoid Category Three—for reasons 
both legal and political. Few claims are as likely to provoke a 
skeptical, if not hostile, reaction from the courts, Congress, and 
the public as a claim that the President has a right as com-
mander in chief to violate an express federal statute, at least 
unless the President’s authority to act exclusively and preclu-
sively with respect to the specific wartime activity in question 
is historically well-established. Avoiding Category Three could 
help a President alleviate the serious friction that these de-
bates engender between the executive and legislative branches 
of government, and in the general public. At the same time, 
courts should be quick, clear, and consistent in deciding war 
powers questions. And as a matter of judicial restraint and 
proper statutory interpretation, courts should be careful about 
finding a commander-in-chief case in Category Three based on 
implied prohibitions alone. 
V.  CONSIDER THE POSSIBLE BENEFITS OF A SINGLE, 
SIX-YEAR PRESIDENTIAL TERM   
Fifth, a major source of problems in Washington today is 
that governance can take a backseat to campaigning. Virtually 
every elected official complains about the distraction caused by 
 
 134. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 585–86 (1952). 
 135. Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 587 (asserting that the President’s Com-
mander-in-Chief authority “need not concern us here. Even though ‘theater of 
war’ be an expanding concept, we cannot with faithfulness to our constitution-
al system hold that the Commander in Chief of the Armed Forces has the ul-
timate power . . . to keep labor disputes from stopping production.”); id. at 644 
(Jackson, J., concurring) (“That military powers of the Commander in Chief 
were not to supersede representative government of internal affairs seems ob-
vious from the Constitution and from elementary American history.”). 
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the “permanent campaign.”136 One of the reasons for this com-
plaint is the frequency with which elections are held. To be 
sure, there is a balance, because elected officials should be ac-
countable to the people, and elections and campaigns connect 
officials to the public. But today the near-constant prospect of 
forthcoming elections often undermines the ability to get things 
done in Washington. 
For present purposes, I will focus only on the pitfalls of the 
modern presidency in the context of the permanent campaign. 
An analysis of two-term presidencies since the adoption of the 
Twenty-Second Amendment reveals some problems. To begin 
with, the requirement that a President prepare for and antic-
ipate re-election leads to several concerns. It distracts from the 
business of running the country. It makes it harder for presi-
dents to tackle difficult but necessary issues in their first 
terms. It leads to the perception (sometimes fair, sometimes 
not) of decisions made with an eye toward the Electoral Col-
lege. In addition, eight years is too long for a President and his 
or her team to stay in top form. The stresses and demands of 
the job have led to more difficult second terms. Indeed, the 
second terms of the last four two-term presidencies are widely 
regarded as having been less successful than their respective 
first terms. One President resigned under the threat of near-
certain impeachment and removal (Nixon),137 one endured the 
major Iran-Contra scandal138 and the bitter defeat of a Su-
preme Court nominee (Reagan),139 one actually was impeached 
and tried in the Senate, albeit not removed (Clinton),140 and 
one experienced setbacks in dealing with the Iraq War141 and 
responding to a major hurricane142 (George W. Bush).  
 
 136. See BRADLEY PATTERSON, THE WHITE HOUSE STAFF: INSIDE THE 
WEST WING AND BEYOND 204–18 (2000). 
 137. See Carroll Kilpatrick, Nixon Resigns, WASH. POST, Aug. 9, 1974, at 
A1. 
 138. See David Johnston, Reagan Nears Center Stage of Iran Contra Affair, 
N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 7, 1990, at A20. 
 139. See Linda Greenhouse, Bork’s Nomination is Rejected, Reagan ‘Sad-
dened,’ N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 24, 1987, at A1. 
 140. See James Bennet & John M. Broder, Clinton Acquitted Decisively: No 
Majority for Either Charge, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 13, 1999, at A1. 
 141. See Susan Saulny, Some Hitherto Staunch G.O.P. Voters Souring on 
Iraq, N.Y. TIMES, May 30, 2007, at A17. On the other hand, President Bush 
has argued that history will look more favorably on the results of the Iraq War 
and particularly the “surge” he ordered late in his second term. See Kate Zer-
nike, Bush’s Legacy vs. the 2008 Election, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 14, 2008, at A4. 
 142. See Hope Yen, FEMA Wasting Millions in Katrina Aid, Audit Finds, 
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It is unclear why recent second-term presidents have had 
more difficulties—and there is a danger of mistaking correla-
tion with causation. History suggests a number of possible ex-
planations: exhaustion, built-up bitterness from the opposing 
party, the inevitable aftermath of a bruising re-election, hubris, 
and many more. Whatever the cause, however, the end results 
have been clear—and sometimes not very pretty. 
Creative ideas to address this problem are worth consider-
ing—even those that might seem radical at first blush. One 
idea is to repeal the Twenty-Second Amendment and return the 
nation to the original constitutional design.143 Another possibil-
ity is to amend the Constitution to provide for a single, six-year 
presidential term.144 A single term is hardly a novel idea. In-
deed, at the Constitutional Convention in 1787, the initial vote 
of the Committee of the Whole was for a single seven-year pres-
idential term.145 As we know, the Framers ultimately adopted 
unlimited four-year terms—which was the rule until the Twen-
ty-Second Amendment, ratified in 1951, set a limit of two four-
year terms.146  
As between those two options—repealing the Twenty-
Second Amendment or affording presidents single six-year 
terms—it seems to me that a single six-year term could achieve 
many benefits. First, it would help prevent the under-analyzed 
and under-appreciated onset of the fatigue that too frequently 
leads to executive branch missteps in second terms.147 Second, 
and consistent with the goal discussed in Part I above of freeing 
the President from unnecessary distractions, a single six-year 
 
WASH. POST, Dec. 7, 2006, at A12. 
 143. See Bruce G. Peabody & Scott E. Gant, The Twice and Future Presi-
dent: Constitutional Interstices and the Twenty-Second Amendment, 83 MINN. 
L. REV. 565, 601–10 (1999) (describing calls for the repeal of the Twenty-
Second Amendment dating from the 1950s). 
 144. See Lawrence L. Schack, Note, A Reconsideration of the Single Six-
Year Presidential Term in Light of Contemporary Election Trends, 12 J.L. & 
POL. 749, 749 (1996). 
 145. See Shlomo Slonim, The Electoral College at Philadelphia: The Evolu-
tion of an Ad Hoc Congress for the Selection of a President, 73 J. AM. HIST. 35, 
38 (1986). 
 146. U.S. CONST. amend. XXII. 
 147. Cf. One Six-Year Presidential Term: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on 
Crime of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 93d Cong. 4–5 (1973) (testimony of 
Theodore C. Sorensen, former Special Counsel to President Kennedy); Schack, 
supra note 144, at 772 (“The evidence suggests that electoral concerns increa-
singly contribute to an already overburdened Chief Executive . . . .”). But see 
Arthur Schlesinger Jr., Against a One-Term, Six-Year President, N.Y. TIMES, 
Jan. 10, 1986, at A27. 
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term would avoid the enormous difficulty of being President 
and running a re-election campaign at the same time. I became 
Staff Secretary to President Bush in July 2003 and witnessed 
first-hand the challenges inherent in running for President and 
being President at the same time. It is fair to say that running 
for re-election while serving as President greatly multiplies the 
complexity of the President’s already difficult job. A senator 
who runs for President can simply skip his Senate duties for 
two years. The President does not have that luxury. Third, a 
single six-year term would alleviate the pressure to think about 
re-election and the need to run something of a permanent cam-
paign that, according to some, alters (or “politicizes”) presiden-
tial and executive branch decision making during the first 
term.148 A President and top executive branch officials who 
never have to think about the President’s re-election would 
have far greater freedom to focus on the business of running a 
country without regard to short-term popular reactions or fun-
draising. This would advance the Framers’ goal of a President 
who is able to resist any “sudden breeze,” “transient impulse,” 
or “temporary delusion” of the people in order to govern from a 
more detached perspective in the interests of the long-term 
public good.149  
Because any change to the presidential term in office 
would be dramatic, require extensive deliberation, and ulti-
mately necessitate passage of a constitutional amendment, I 
would not expect it to happen anytime soon. There are down-
sides to the single six-year presidential term, perhaps most ob-
viously the fact that a popular or effective President would be 
precluded from remaining in office for an additional two years. 
In addition, some might say that this would make the Presi-
dent a lame duck from day one, or reduce his accountability. As 
a logical matter, however, these objections would apply also to 
the Twenty-Second Amendment’s existing prohibition on serv-
ing more than two elected terms in office.150 Anyone who ob-
jects to my proposal on these grounds logically should object to 
the Twenty-Second Amendment as well.  
The Framers of the Constitution established an amend-
ment process and emphasized the importance of practical expe-
rience—“the guide that ought always to be followed whenever it 
 
 148. See PATTERSON, supra note 136, at 204–18.  
 149. THE FEDERALIST NO. 71, at 400 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossi-
ter ed., 1999). 
 150. U.S. CONST. amend. XXII, § 1. 
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can be found”151 in constitutional design. That experience has 
prompted numerous structural amendments during our histo-
ry—four of which directly involved the presidency: the Twelfth, 
Twentieth, Twenty-Second, and Twenty-Fifth.152 At this time in 
our history, experience shows that the status quo of two presi-
dential terms since 1951 has not worked all that well. It may be 
time to consider again a single, six-year presidential term.153  
CONCLUSION 
The challenges facing the forty-fourth President—like 
those facing presidents before him—are enormous and daunt-
ing. Separation of powers controversies like those that chal-
lenged his predecessors will recur. It is a good time to take 
stock of those lessons, to examine our foundational structures, 
and to develop creative solutions to address the structural chal-
lenges of the future. I hope these ideas help advance that dis-
cussion. 
 
 151. THE FEDERALIST NO. 52, at 295 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter 
ed., 1999). 
 152. See U.S. CONST. amends. XII, XX, XXII, and XXV. For a discussion of 
the relationship between these and other structural provisions in the Consti-
tution, see Diane P. Wood, Our 18th Century Constitution in the 21st Century 
World, 80 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1079, 1082–83 (2005). 
 153. Any such proposal should of course take effect after the then-current 
President has had an opportunity to serve two terms. 
